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The typical seasoned offer in the UK by smaller listed companies is no longer a conventional
rights issue but an issue involving placed shares. Discounts provide substantial rewards to
buyers of placed shares, and are related to proxies for costs of investing in the issuer. The
difficulty of rewarding buyers of rights in the market is seen as a major disadvantage of the
rights issue method. The study finds a negative relation between the discount and market
reaction to an issue, which possibly reflects adjustment of the offer price for anticipated
change in the share price.
JEL codes: G32; G24; G14.
Keywords: rights issue; discount; private placing; open offer.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Paul Draper for helpful comments and Elizabeth McDiarmid and Kevin
Acton for careful research assistance. The support of the Economic and Social Research
Council (UK) and of Walter Scott & Partners is gratefully acknowledged. The research was
partly funded by ESRC number: R000221760.
*Management School, University of Edinburgh, 50 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, UK.
Tel: 44 131 650 3794; fax: 44 131 668 3053; email: s.armitage@ed.ac.uk.
1
1. Introduction
In a conventional rights issue, existing shareholders are offered all the new shares and
the rights to them can be sold during the offer period. The only reason for a discount is to
reduce the risk of the market price falling below the offer price before the offer closes; depth
of discount makes no difference to the wealth of subscribing or non-subscribing shareholders,
nor is it a cost to the company. Most seasoned offers by smaller listed companies in the UK no
longer fit this description, because a large proportion of the shares is privately placed with
investors. Placed shares are not taken up by existing shareholders, and the route of selling
rights in the market is bypassed. Any discount of placed shares is a cost either to non-
subscribing shareholders or to the company, so the depth of discount is critical. This paper
documents the extent of placing in seasoned offers, examines determinants of the discount,
and suggests why placing has become common.
The growth of placing is reflected in the rapid increase in the number of open offers,
which were almost unheard-of before 1987 but had become as common as rights issues by
1996. In an open offer, existing shareholders retain their ‘pre-emption’ right of first refusal,
and can subscribe for the shares they are entitled to during the offer period, as in a rights issue.
The difference is that the rights can not be sold in the market. All the new shares are placed
with investing institutions, usually just before the offer is publicly announced, subject to
‘clawback’ to satisfy demand from existing shareholders. Shares not taken up by the offer
close are bought by the institutions with which they were placed. Any discount makes non-
subscribing shareholders worse off, since it causes a fall in the price of the existing shares
when they go ex-rights, and the rights are worthless unless the holders subscribe. Despite this,
most open offers are made at an appreciable discount and on average half of the shares are not
taken up by the shareholders entitled to them. By the mid-1990s, 80% of seasoned offers in
the UK were either open offers, rights issues in which some of the shares were privately
placed, or pure private placings not offered pro rata to extsing shareholders. The discount in
open offers and rights issues with placed shares is worth an average of 8.3% of the offer price
(median 6.1%), and in addition the buyers receive a cash placing fee averaging 1.1% (1.3%).
There is no previous research on open offers, but the discount has been studied in
conventional rights issues and in pure private placings. Studies of rights issues in several
countries have tested the idea that the discount acts as a signal about the quality of the issuer
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(Marsh, 1977; Loderer & Zimmerman, 1988; Tsangarakis, 1996; Bøhren et al, 1997; Bigelli,
1999). They find little or no relation between the discount and the market reaction to the issue
on announcement, and conclude that the discount is not a signal. Singh (1997) reports that the
discount is related to the (nonsystematic) risk of the issuer’s shares, as expected if its purpose
is to reduce the risk of offer failure. Substantial discounts are found in most private placings
(Wruck, 1989; Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Goh et al, 1999) as well as most rights issues, but the
reason for a discount in a placing can not be to reduce the risk of offer failure, since there is no
offer period. A discount may reflect limited market liquidity; Holthausen et al (1987) find that
large blocks of existing shares are sold at a discount. Another possibility is that discounts
repay costs of investing in the issuer. Wruck (1989) argues that discounts in placings of new
shares compensate investors with large stakes for future monitoring costs, whereas Hertzel &
Smith (1993) argue that they compensate for costs of investigating the issuer.
Our analysis of the determinants of discounts augments the above evidence. We find
that discounts are related to proxies for costs of investing in the issuer, as well as to the
nonsystematic risk of the issuer’s shares. Controlling for these factors, discounts are
significantly less deep in open offers, which is consistent with the view that their primary
purpose in open offers is to reward new investors (they are a cost to be minimised). The
evidence on the relation between discounts and liquidity is ambiguous. An unexpected finding
is a clear negative relation between discounts and abnormal returns on announcement and
during the offer period, which is not consistent with previous research. In our sample, issues at
a discount to the market price of 30% or deeper, measured before the announcement, have a
cumulative average abnormal return of -19% on announcement and during the offer. Perusal
of prospectuses of deep discount issues reveals that 80% of the issuers are in difficulty. For
the minority of deep discount issues by healthy companies, the average abnormal return on
announcement is close to zero, which suggests that a deep discount itself is not treated as a
negative signal. Our interpretation is that some companies in difficulty anticipate a fall in their
share price on announcement of the issue and of associated bad news, and they adjust the offer
price downwards to allow for the expected price fall.
The substantial rewards provided to buyers of placed shares and the evidence that the
discount is related to costs of investment point to a problem with rights issues, which is that
the rights issue method is not designed to reward buyers of rights. This is a serious
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disadvantage if a reward is often required, as the evidence from placed shares indicates. It
implies that the comparative advantage of open offers is related to the proportion of the issue
not subscribed for by existing shareholders and to the reward required by new investors.
Comparisons between rights issues and open offers show that the open offer method is indeed
used for issues with a relatively low contribution from existing shareholders and with relatively
high proxies for costs of investing in the issuer.
The need to reward new investors and the fact that this can be done through an open
offer or placing could help explain the disappearance of rights issues in the USA, which is
puzzling because the direct costs of firm commitment offers are higher (Smith, 1977; Eckbo &
Masulis, 1992). The advantages of placing or bookbuilding have so far been viewed as fairly
modest. Hansen (1988) points out that there are transactions costs for sellers and buyers of
rights,1 which he argues are reflected in a temporary fall in the issuer’s share price during a
rights issue, which is reversed afterwards. However, Eckbo & Masulis (1992) and Singh
(1997) find little evidence of price reversal and doubt the importance of transactions costs.
Whilst the present paper finds some evidence of price reversal, it is not conclusive and our
case does not rest on it. We argue that the extent of placing and the size of rewards to buyers
of placed shares clearly indicate the scale of the problem caused by inability to reward buyers
of rights reliably. It seems likely, in the light of the UK evidence, that investors in firm
commitment offers in the USA often receive similar substantial rewards, though the amounts
are unknown. The obscurity of the rewards to investors in firm commitments may have led
observers to overlook the problem in rights issues of rewarding buyers of rights.
The next section gives background information on rights issues, open offers and
private placings. Section 3 describes the sample, Section 4 presents evidence on placed shares
______________
1. Transactions costs include the bid-ask spread and brokers’ commissions on the rights, possible capital
gains tax on selling rights, and possible costs to the buyer, eg of investigating the issuer. Placing avoids the
costs of trading rights and could reduce the buyer’s costs. Other explanations for the adoption of firm
commitments in the USA are that investment banks induced company managers to choose them (Smith, 1977);
that the bid-ask spread of the issuer’s shares widens after rights issues and narrows after firm commitments
(Kothare, 1997); and that underwriters in rights issues do not support the share price because they short-sell
the issuer’s shares when they buy rights, which creates a hedged short sale position (Singh, 1997). There is no
mention of short-selling of shares by buyers of rights in the extensive evidence collected by the MMC (1999),
or in any other UK source we know of. The adverse selection theory of Eckbo & Masulis (1992) concerns the
choice between underwritten and non-underwritten issues. The choice between underwritten rights issues and
firm commitments is determined in their model by transactions costs, though they do not stress this.
4
and the rewards received by investors, and Section 5 examines determinants of the discount.
Section 6 explains the difficulty in rewarding buyers of rights, compares open offers with
rights issues and comments on the disappearance of rights issues in the USA. Section 7
concludes.
2. Background on rights issues, open offers and private placings
In a rights issue, new shares are offered to existing shareholders in proportion to the
number of shares they own. For example, a one for two issue means that shareholders are
entitled to buy, and are provisionally allotted, one new share for every two shares they own.
The prospectus is posted the day the offer is announced and if no extraordinary general
meeting (EGM) is needed to authorise the issue, the offer period of at least three weeks begins
on the announcement day. If an EGM is necessary, there is a gap of two or three weeks
between the announcement and the EGM, and the offer period starts the day after the EGM.
The rights can be traded in the same way as shares during the offer period. The offer price is
decided the evening before the issue is announced, whether or not there is an EGM, and is
usually set at a discount to the market price.
Descriptions of conventional rights issues (for example, Arnold, 1998, pp. 405-8;
Brealey & Myers, 2000, pp. 425-7) emphasise that the depth of discount does not matter to
non-subscribing shareholders because they can sell their rights. The existing shares go ex-
rights the day after the announcement or after the EGM, if there is one. Buyers of the shares
on or after the ex-date are not entitled to participate in the issue so that, other things equal, the
market price falls on the ex-date to reflect the scrip element of the issue. The notional price of
a right is the difference between the ex-rights share price and the offer price (ignoring the
right’s time value), and the actual price is kept close to this by the possibility of arbitrage
between the shares and the rights.2 Non-subscribing shareholders are compensated for the fall
in their shares on the ex-date by the value they receive for their rights. The only reason for a
discount is to reduce the risk of the issuer’s share price falling below the offer price. If this
happens, the rights become worthless, the sub-underwriters (if any) will be required to take up
_______________
2. A study of the market for rights during 1995-97 by Credit Suisse First Boston, reproduced in MMC
(1999, pp. 244-6), finds that rights trade at an average discount to their notional price of 0.5% of the ex-rights
share price, using mid-point prices. The sample is restricted to large issues of £50m or more. The study notes
that traders do arbitrage between the shares and the rights.
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unsold shares, and the company and its advisers will suffer the embarrassment of a ‘failed’
issue. The sub-underwriters are investing institutions to which the investment bank acting as
lead underwriter has transferred the underwriting risk on or before the announcement day. The
depth of discount should be related to the risk of offer failure, especially since the sub-
underwriting commission was a fixed 1.25% of the offer price in virtually all UK rights issues
up to the end of 1996.
A variant on the rights issue method known as the open offer started to be used in the
late 1980s, and rapidly became popular. In an open offer, the new shares are placed with
investors on or shortly before the announcement day, but the shares are also offered pro rata
to existing shareholders, who have priority. The offer period is at least three weeks. The rights
can not be sold, which means that any discount implies a transfer of wealth from non-
subscribing shareholders. The share price falls on the ex-day, as in a rights issue, and non-
subscribers are not compensated for the fall in value of their existing shares.3 The investors
with whom the shares have been placed receive all the shares not subscribed for by the existing
shareholders, whereas in a rights issue the sub-underwriters will only receive shares if the offer
fails. Open offer terminology reflects the fact that the primary function of placing is to sell the
shares rather than to transfer underwriting risk; the investors are referred to as ‘placees’ and
the new shares are said to be ‘placed with clawback’; an institution acting as a placee agrees to
buy a certain number of shares, some of which will be ‘clawed back’ to satisfy demand from
existing shareholders wishing to subscribe.
Private placings are a third type of seasoned share issue in common use. A private
placing or subscription or placing without clawback is an issue in which the new shares are
placed with one or more investors and are not offered pro rata to existing shareholders. A
special resolution has to have been passed which disapplies shareholders’ pre-emption rights
for 12 months; there is no restriction on re-sale of the shares; and any discount is a cost to the
issuer. A special type of placing is the issue of shares to the shareholders of a company being
acquired, in exchange for the acquired company’s shares. The acquired company’s
_______________
3. The ex-rights day in an open offer is usually the day after the announcement, otherwise it is the
announcement day. If an EGM is necessary to authorise issue of the shares, it is held after the offer period,
unlike in a rights issue. Although there is no market for the rights, buyers of the shares before the ex-day are
entitled to participate in the open offer, and this entitlement has value if the offer is at a discount.
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shareholders are referred to as vendors and the shares issued to them are known as vendor
consideration shares. In this paper, the term ‘private placing’ encompasses both types of
placing except where a distinction is made between them. Many rights issues and open offers
are accompanied by a private placing, which is not part of the rights issue or open offer
because the shares are not offered pro rata to existing shareholders. But the shares are issued
through the same prospectus and, almost always, on the same terms as the shares in the rights
issue or open offer.
3. Data and preliminary evidence
The sample consists of 928 rights issues and 450 open offers made between 1 January
1985 and 30 September 1996. Issues by foreign companies and by investment trusts (closed
end investment funds) are excluded. Information on issues is from prospectuses. Scanned
copies from 1 July 1991 onwards are available from Primark Extel, which aims to include all
issues by listed companies. Extel keeps some prospectuses on microfiche for issues before 1
July 1991, though its collection is incomplete. All appropriate issues from 1 January 1985 to
30 September 1996 are included for which Extel has a prospectus.
Table 1 provides annual data on the number and size of rights issues and open offers,
the discount to the market price (dis-to-mkt) and to the theoretical ex-rights price (dis-to-
TERP). A deeper discount means a more positive value. The size of an offer is the proceeds
gross of direct costs, including any private placing. The market price is the mid-point between
the highest bid and the lowest offer from market makers at the close of the day before the
announcement. The TERP is the market price times the proportion of existing shares in the
total after issue plus the offer price times the proportion of new shares in the total. In both
measures, the net dividend per share to which the new shares are not entitled, if any, is
subtracted from the market price of the existing shares. Dis-to-mkt is known for certain when
the offer price is set, the evening before the announcement, but dis-to-TERP is arguably a
more accurate measure because the TERP is the expected market price of the existing shares
ex-rights and of the new shares, assuming the market price does not change except on the ex-
day to reflect the scrip element of the issue. If shares are not offered to existing shareholders,
the existing shares have no rights, there is no scrip element and the TERP concept does not
apply, even if the issue is at a discount. For this reason, the number of new shares used in
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calculating the TERP is the number of shares in the rights issue or open offer only. If the issue
is at a premium, the TERP equals the market price.
In 24 issues the discount could not be calculated because we could not find a market
price for the relevant day, or because no offer price is given. In 70 issues Extel records a
market price though trading in the share had been suspended by the Stock Exchange, in which
case the price recorded is the price at which the share was suspended. We leave issues with
suspended shares in the sample but exclude them from the event study. 1,214 issues are at a
discount, 20 are at the market price, 66 are at a premium and 54 are accompanied by a share
consolidation. In analyses involving discounts, 49 issues made at a premium of 5% or more to
the market price are excluded, because the premium is likely to be payment for acquiring a
controlling interest (Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Wruck, 1989), and changes in control are
beyond the scope of this paper. Issues accompanied by a share consolidation are also
excluded.4 The 17 issues at a premium of less than 5% are retained because the offer price
could have been set in anticipation of a rise in the share price on announcement of the issue.
Several points emerge from Table 1. The growth in open offers is apparent; the first in
our sample was in 1987 and by 1996 they accounted for over half of issues by number. Rights
issues are larger; the average rights issue raises £56.0m (median £17.3m) in September 1996
pounds, compared with £17.3m (£7.6m) for open offers. There is a big difference in the
discount between the two types of offer. The average discount to the market price in rights
issues is 21.0% (17.6%) compared with 13.0% (7.8%) in open offers.5 There is no obvious
trend in rights issue or open offer discounts during 1985-96, except perhaps that rights issue
discounts are somewhat less deep in 1995 and 1996.
_______________
4. They appear to have premiums of several hundred per cent, but this is illusory because one new share
will replace a number of existing shares on implementation of the consolidation after the EGM. A discount can
be calculated against the market price or TERP adjusted for the consolidation, but in view of additional
complexities (eg two adjustments to the price record), it was decided to exclude these issues from analyses
involving discounts.
5. Stock Exchange Listing Rule 4.8 states that discounts in open offers must not be deeper than 10% of
the market price ‘unless the Exchange is satisfied that the issuer is in severe financial difficulties or that there
are other exceptional circumstances’ (London Stock Exchange, 1997). In addition, the Investment Committees
of the Association of British Insurers and the National Association of Pension Funds recommend that the
discount to the market price in private placings for cash (ie excluding vendor consideration issues) be no
deeper than 5%, including underwriting or placing fees (MMC, 1999, p. 239). These limits do not appear to be
binding in practice. 30% of open offers in our sample are at a discount deeper than 10% and 72% of the
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private placings for cash accompanying rights issues or open offers are at a discount deeper than 5% (88% if




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The paper deploys results of an event study using the method in Eckbo & Masulis
(1992) (see Table 5). An advantage of this method is that it enables a significance test to be
calculated for the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for the offer period, despite
the fact that this period varies in length. The number of issues with event study results is
1,010. The reasons for exclusion from the event study are: the requisite share price data are
not in the Extel database (237 issues); suspension of trading by the Stock Exchange was in
force when the issue was announced (70); and no adjustment has been made to the price
record for the scrip element on the ex-day (61).6 There are suitable data for six of the 11 offers
which were announced but not completed, and abnormal returns for these six are included for
the announcement period only.
4. Placed shares and the discount as a reward
A discount rewards buyers of placed shares, which include shares in private placings,
shares not subscribed for by those entitled to them in open offers, and pre-renounced shares in
rights issues. The latter category requires explanation. In both rights issues and open offers,
shareholders may choose to renounce their entitlements before the public announcement, in
which case the shares are placed. This makes little difference in an open offer; pre-renounced
shares are said to be ‘placed firm’, the remainder are ‘placed with clawback’, and the shares
pre-renounced are simply part of the total not subscribed for by those entitled to them. But in
a rights issue, the decision to renounce the rights in advance means that they are not sold in
the market and that the discount provides a reward to the buyers. This is because the London
Stock Exchange (1997, 4.17(c)) has a rule that shareholders who pre-renounce their rights
receive only 50% of the difference between the TERP and the offer price. 50% is, in practice,
the maximum received; pre-renouncing shareholders sometimes elect to waive all of the
compensation for their rights, presumably to help place them. The Stock Exchange normally
requires the proportion pre-renounced to be at least 25%, implying that permission is given
because it may be difficult to sell a large proportion of the rights in the market.
_______________
6.  If the offer price is below the market price at the close of the day before the ex-date, share prices
before the ex-date should be multiplied by an adjustment factor reflecting the scrip element. Failure to do this
results in downward bias of abnormal returns during the offer period (unreported results for the sample of all
issues with share data indicate that this bias reduces the offer period CAAR by 0.75%).
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Table 2. Placed shares in rights issues and open offers
___________________________________________________________________________
All Rights Open Test
issues issues offers stats for
Proportion of issues (%) (%) (%) difference
With some pre-renounced shares 34.0 27.6 47.3 4.651
Accompanied by a private placing for cash 12.4 6.7 24.2 6.86
Accompanied by a placing with shareholders 22.3 16.4 34.4 5.27
of a company being acquired
Issues with at least one of the above 53.1 42.2 75.3 6.26
N (with or without placed shares) 1,378 928 450
In issues with placed shares, mean
proportion of total issue consisting of:
Pre-renounced shares 30.1 30.9 29.1 -0.88,1 0.332
Shares privately placed for cash 44.7 48.9 42.3 -1.83, 0.07
Shares placed with shareholders of a 27.9 28.4 27.5 -0.36, 0.75
company being acquired
All placed shares
Mean 41.5 38.9 44.4 3.00, 0.00
Median 41.3 37.4 46.6
___________________________________________________________________________
In all open offers, mean proportion of 61.5
placed shares including all shares not
subscribed for by those entitled to them3
Total value of placed shares/ 14.4 8.0 53.5
total value of all shares issued4
___________________________________________________________________________
1. t-statistic for open offer proportion or mean less rights issue proportion or mean. 2. p-value
of Wilcoxon’s rank sum test for differences between samples (not applicable in comparing
proportions). 3. Not applicable in rights issues; rights to shares not pre-renounced and not
subscribed for are sold on the market. N = 394; number of shares bought by existing
shareholders is unknown in 56 open offers. 4. Includes all issues. In the 56 open offers with
unknown take-up, the amount placed is estimated by the amounts pre-renounced and privately
placed.
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Table 2 provides evidence on the extent of direct placing. 42% of rights issues and
75% of open offers either have some pre-renounced shares, or are accompanied by a private
placing, or both, and the average proportion of the total issue placed in these samples is 39%
in rights issues and 44% in open offers. All open offers have a residue of shares not subscribed
for by the end of the offer, in addition to any pre-renounced shares. Shares not taken up will
already have been placed with clawback and are therefore allocated to the placees at the offer
close. Including these shares, the average proportion placed in open offers is 62%.7 Counting
all open offers as issues with some placing, 61% of issues have some placed shares (74%
during 1994-96). The findings are similar if the sample is restricted to issues at a discount (not
shown in Table 2). 59% of issues at a discount have some placed shares and the average
proportion placed is 38% in rights issues and 58% in open offers. Shareholders choose to pre-
renounce their rights in 28% of rights issues at a discount, despite the loss of half the potential
value of the rights on the market. The proportion placed of the total value of shares is only
14%, because most large issues are conventional rights issues with no placed shares.
Table 3 shows mean and median estimated rewards to buyers of placed shares. The
sample consists of rights issues involving placed shares and all open offers, excluding issues at
a premium of 5% or more or with a share consolidation. Buyers are rewarded by any placing
fee for cash and by any discount to the TERP;8 both are expressed in the table as a percentage
of the offer price. A premium results in a negative value. A firm placing fee is often given
explicitly in the prospectus, otherwise the fee is assumed to be the sub- underwriting fee in
rights issues or the fee for placing with clawback in open offers. The value of the discount is
halved in rights issues, which is appropriate for pre-renounced rights (though the cost of the
discount in private placings accompanying rights issues is the full value of the dis-to-TERP).
The average value of the total reward is 9.3% (median 7.2%) of _______________
7. The number of rights taken up is normally reported at the close of rights issues and open offers. In
rights issues the reported take-up includes subscriptions by buyers of rights in the market as well as by
shareholders originally entitled to the rights, but in open offers the reported take-up is entirely by existing
shareholders.
8. This assumes that the share price is expected to stay the same, except for the fall to allow for the scrip
element on the ex-date. The CAAR on announcement and during the offer period is -18.6% in deep discount
issues, -4.9% in rights issues and 1.8% in open offers (Tables 5 and 8). To the extent that changes in price are
anticipated by issuers before the announcement, the figures overstate the anticipated value of the discount in
deep discount and rights issues and understate it in open offers.
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Table 3. Rewards for buyers of placed shares
The table shows estimates of the placing fee and dis-to-TERP expressed as a percentage of the
offer price. The sample consists of rights issues with placed shares and all open offers, except
for issues at a premium of 5% or more or with a share consolidation. If the prospectus records
a separate ‘firm placing’ fee, this is the fee used, otherwise it is the fee for sub-underwriting in
a rights issue or for ‘placing with clawback’ in an open offer, otherwise it is the fee paid to the
arranger, less an assumed 0.75% retained by the arranger, or less 0.50% if a separate broker’s
fee is recorded. Dis-to-TERP is divided by two for rights issues. Total rewards  =  placing fee
plus dis-to-TERP, if both are known.
___________________________________________________________________________
Total rewards Placing fee Dis-to-TERP
(%) (%) (%)
All issues
Mean 9.26 1.10 8.25
Median 7.21 1.25 6.13
Standard deviation 9.10 0.66 9.18
N 698 711 748
Rights issues
Mean 9.03 1.26 7.77
Median 7.76 1.50 6.33
Standard deviation 6.16 0.57 6.20
N 319 327 355
Open offers
Mean 9.44 0.97 8.69
Median 6.63 1.25 5.81
Standard deviation 10.98 0.71 11.20
N 379 384 393
___________________________________________________________________________
the offer price, over 80% of which is represented by the discount. The average discount is
8.3% (6.1%) and the average placing fee is 1.1% (1.3%). Almost all placing fees are between
0.5% and 2.5%; discounts are much more variable, but  92% of the issues with placed shares
have a discount worth at least 1% of the offer price.With the rights issue dis-to-TERP divided
by two, the rewards for buying placed shares are similar in rights issue and open offers. The
figures in Table 3 do not apply to the buyers of rights sold in the market, who receive neither a
placing fee nor a discount.
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It is worth checking whether stand-alone private placings, not accompanied by a rights
issue or open offer, are also made at a discount. As there is no existing UK evidence on pure
private placings, a sample was collected by reading the reports on all issues categorised as
‘placings’ by Extel News Service during 1994-96. There is no prospectus, and little
information is reported apart from the amount and the offer price. There were 172 pure
placings by UK companies, excluding placings by investment trusts, of which 146 have the
requisite data. If 172 is close to the full  population, there were about 60 pure placings a year
in the mid-1990s by UK companies, other than investment trusts, compared with around 200
rights issues and open offers a year. Since only one quarter of the latter 200 were pure rights
issues, about 80% of UK seasoned offers were partly or wholly placed by the mid-90s. We
measure the discount in relation to the market price at the close of the day before the
announcement and to the average market price during the five trading days before the
announcement, to allow for the possibility that the announcement may be a day or two later
than when the placing was agreed. Three placings at a premium exceeding 5% are excluded so
that the results are comparable with those for rights issues and open offers. The results, in
Table 4, confirm that a large majority of pure placings are made at an appreciable discount in
the UK, though it is somewhat less deep than the dis-to-TERP in open offers. The average
discount to the market price the day before the announcement is 5.8% (median 4.0%); the
figures using the five day average price are almost identical. The average dis-to-TERP in open
offers is 8.7% (median 5.8%), which is significantly deeper (t = 3.6). 9.6% of the placings are
at a premium, including the three excluded from the discount calculation.
5. Determinants of the discount
5.1 Risk of offer failure
This section examines how discounts are set. They are deep enough to be a substantial
cost of issue in most open offers and most of the 42% of rights issues with placed shares.
Previous research on the costs of seasoned offers has tended to concentrate either on the cash
costs or on the change in market value on announcement. We start with the role of the
discount in a conventional rights issue, which is to reduce the risk of offer failure. A relation
between the discount and the volatility of the issuer’s shares is predicted, and to investigate
this, we use three measures of volatility; the market model beta and standard error estimated
from daily returns during 80 days before and 80 days after the issue, and the share’s beta at the
time of the announcement as estimated by London Business School’s Risk Measurement
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Table 4. Discounts in pure private placings, 1994-96
Discounts are calculated in the same way as for rights issues and open offers. Any net dividend
per share to which placed shares are not entitled is subtracted from the market price or average
market price. Three placings at a premium of more than 5% on both measures are excluded.
___________________________________________________________________________




Proportion at a premium 9.6%




Proportion at a premium 12.3%






Service, from monthly returns over 60 months, with Bayesian adjustments. We find that depth
of discount is significantly related to standard error (daily std error) in both types of offer, but
not to either measure of beta, which is consistent with Singh (1997). The results are not
reported to save space.
5.2 Deep discounts and adjustment for anticipated change in share price
The discount measured using the market price or TERP immediately before the
announcement may be a biased estimate of the discount expected after the announcement. It is
plausible that in some cases the company and its advisers expect a change in the share price on
announcement of the issue and of other information. For example, they may suspect that the
prospectus, when published, will reveal that recent trading has been worse than investors were
expecting, and they might adjust the offer price downwards in anticipation of a fall in the share
price. It is possible that the discount itself is treated by investors as a signal; it may itself affect
the market reaction. Either way, a negative relation is predicted between depth of discount and
abnormal returns on announcement. However, most existing evidence is against this
16
prediction. Marsh (1977) for the UK, Tsangarakis (1996) for Greece and Bøhren et al (1997)
for Norway find no relation between depth of discount and abnormal return on announcement,
while Loderer & Zimmerman (1988) for Switzerland and Bigelli (1998) for Italy find a
positive relation.9 A deeper discount could be a positive sign because, for a given amount
raised and assuming an unchanged or increased dividend per share, a deeper discount implies a
higher dividend yield and larger total dividend post issue, which implies that the issuer is
confident about paying more cash to shareholders.
In our sample, though, there is a significant negative relation between abnormal returns
and discounts. Table 5 shows results of OLS regressions; the results are qualitatively similar
using weighted least squares in which the abnormal returns are divided by their standard
errors. The variable measuring the change in dividend yield, which is the same as that used by
Bigelli (1998), has a negative coefficient. This is the opposite of that predicted by the increase-
in-yield hypothesis, but is not surprising given that div yld has a correlation coefficient of 0.70
with dis-to-mkt and 0.50 with dis-to-TERP. Deeply discounted issues are associated with
especially large falls in the share price. 127 rights issues and 47 open offers are made at a
discount of 30% to the market price or deeper, hereafter referred to as a deep discount. In this
sample, the CAAR is -8.3% on announcement and -10.4% during the offer period, with some
recovery after the offer.10
_______________
9. A test of the relation between abnormal returns on announcement and the depth of discount is not
possible in US rights issues, because they are announced before the offer price is set and the offer period starts.
Eckbo & Masulis (1992) find no relation between the discount and abnormal returns on the day the offer starts,
while Singh (1997) reports a significantly negative relation between the discount and cumulative abnormal
returns from the day before the start to six days after.
10. Abnormal returns are not adjusted for cash costs of issue or the cost to the issuer of privately placed
shares at a discount. This is partly for consistency with most other event studies of seasoned offers, but mainly
because there is no relation between abnormal returns and costs of issue, suggesting that the costs are not
capitalised on announcement (Armitage, 1999).
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Table 5. Abnormal returns and discounts
Abnormal returns are calculated as follows. For each offer a market model regression is run
using daily data and dummy variables to distinguish sub-periods of interest:
Rit   =   αi  +  βiRMt  +  γ1iD1t  +  γ2iD2t  +  γ3iD3t  +  γ4iD4t  +  eit
where Rit = return on share i on day t; RMt = return on FT-Actuaries All Share Index on day t;
D1t = 1 for event days -1 to 0, and 0 otherwise, day 0 being the announcement day; D2t = 1 for
days +1 to C-2, day C being the close of the offer; D3t = 1 for days C-1 to C, and D4t = 1 for
days C+1 to C+20. If a share goes ex-dividend during the event period, the net dividend per
share is added to the ex-day price to calculate the return on that day. The combined estimation
and event period is from 85 days before the announcement (day 0) to 100 days after the close
of the offer (day C). The coefficient γi is a measure of the abnormal return for each day of the
sub-period concerned. Days +1 to C-2 are referred to as the offer period, though in rights
issues they incorporate the ‘pre-offer’ period between announcement and EGM, if there is
one. The offer close, days C-1 to C, is separated out because trading in rights in a rights issue
ceases two days before the closing date, at the end of day C-2 (MMC, 1999, p. 246). The
cumulative abnormal return is γi times the number of days in the sub-period. γi can be averaged
across the sample and the test statistic for the significance of the sub-period averageγi is:
z   =   √N(av[γi/sγi])
where N is the number of offers in the sample and sγi is the standard error of the γi coefficient
for share i. z-statistics are in italics.
___________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Cumulative average abnormal returns in deep discount issues (30% to the
market price or deeper)
Announcement Offer Offer Post
 (days -1 to 0) period close offer
(+1 to C-2) (C-1 to C) (C+1 to C+20)
All issues -8.29% -10.35% 1.07% 7.51%
(N = 115) -16.35 -4.80 2.00 2.93
% negative 72.2 69.6 42.6 40.0
Rights issues -7.48% -10.76% 1.40% 7.96%
(N = 92) -14.38 -4.36 2.29 2.97
% negative 73.9 70.7 41.3 42.4
Open offers -11.52% -8.74% -0.22% 5.73%
(N = 23) -7.79 -2.01 -0.11 0.62
% negative 65.2 65.2 47.8 30.4
___________________________________________________________________________
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Panel B: Regression results
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CARit) for the relevant event period. Div yield = ((mkt price/TERP) x (new
DPS/previous DPS)) - 1. New DPS/previous DPS is assumed to equal one unless the prospectus contains a new DPS forecast. Companies not
paying a dividend are excluded. Rights issue = one for a rights issue and zero otherwise. t-statistics are in italics.
Announcement abnormal return Offer period abnormal return
All All All Rights Open All All All Rights Open
issues issues issues issues offers issues issues issues issues offers
Model 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Constant 0.044 0.040 0.040 0.020 0.047 0.026 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.028
6.44 5.78 5.45 2.60 2.43 2.68 2.24 2.08 1.97 2.56
Dis-to-mkt -0.234 -0.189 -0.219 -0.261 -0.261 -0.215 -0.251 -0.279
-8.65 -4.68 -6.44 -5.93 -6.61 -3.67 -5.07 -4.32
Dis-to-TERP -0.283 -0.318
-7.16 -5.56
Div yield -0.044 -0.046
-1.56 -1.13
Rights issue -0.020 -0.022 0.020 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
-2.59 -2.81 -2.35 -0.13 -0.26 -0.18
Adj R2 9.9% 7.8% 9.8% 5.6% 10.7% 4.7% 3.5% 4.9% 3.5% 5.8%
F-value 53.9 41.7 31.6 41.4 35.1 24.9 18.4 15.4 25.7 18.7
N 967 966 854 680 287 962 961 850 676 286
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6. Evidence on deep discounts
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A: Reason for deep discount Number %
1. Crisis. The Chairman’s letter states explicitly that the company will not survive or is unlikely to survive 56 32.2
unless the issue proceeds.
2. Distress. The letter states or implies that the issue would not have been proposed were the company 63  36.2
not in financial difficulty, but stops short of saying the company could not continue without the issue.
3. Recent or current difficult trading. There is no apparent reason for a deep discount except that the 22 12.6
letter states that trading is or has recently been difficult.
4. Risky use of proceeds. The letter emphasises that the proceeds will be used in a speculative venture. 5 2.9
These are either mining or technology companies.
5. To dispense with cost of underwriting. This reason is given in nine letters, but one of the companies 7  4.0
is in category three and one in category four.




Panel B: Event study results CAAR (%) % negative CAAR (%) % negative N
Poor performers (categories 1-3) 
All issues -10.29 72.4 -9.89 69.6 94
Rights issues -9.82 75.3 -9.24 69.4 73
Open offers -11.93 61.9 -12.23 70.0 21
Others (categories 4-6)
All issues 0.67 71.4 -13.37 76.2 21
Rights issues 1.50 68.4 -17.07 79.0 19
Open offers -7.23 100.0 21.78 50.0 2
Test statistics for difference (all issues) 2.13,1 0.132 -0.56, 0.32
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1. t-statistic for CAAR for all others less CAAR for all poor performers. 2. p-value of  Wilcoxon’s rank sum test.
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To learn directly about the reasons for choosing a deep discount, we read the
Chairman’s letter to shareholders in the prospectuses of the deep discount issues. The
Chairman’s letter usually runs for several pages, describing the background to the issue and
other major events in train. There are a number of standard headings including reasons for the
issue, terms of the issue and current trading. It turns out that many letters do not explicitly
discuss or even mention the fact that the issue is at an abnormally deep discount, but we infer
the reason if possible, and the findings are shown in Table 6. 119 (68%) of the issuers were in
serious trouble; either the company could not continue at all without an injection of new
equity, or it was making the issue because there was an urgent need for funds due to poor
performance. If the discount is referred to in these cases, it is always to say that the offer price
is ‘fair and reasonable’ in the light of the poor performance. A further 22 (13%) of issuers had
experienced some difficulty, though it is not certain that this was the reason for the issue or for
the deep discount. Five (3%) were raising funds for investment in mining or technology
projects, the speculative nature of which is emphasised in the letter. Only nine letters (5%)
state that a reason for the deep discount is to avoid paying for underwriting by the arranger.
There is no apparent reason in 21 (12%) of the letters.
Panel B of Table 6 shows announcement and offer period CAARs for sub-samples of
poorly performing and healthy deep discount issuers. 115 of the deep discounts have usable
event study data. The CAAR on announcement is -10.3% for the 81% of issues by poor
performers compared with 0.7% for the deep discount issues by apparently healthy companies,
though the proportion of negative abnormal returns is similar in both sub-samples. The much
smaller reaction to deep discounts by healthy issuers suggests that most of the negative
relation between depth of discount and abnormal returns is due to adjustment of the offer price
for an expected fall in price on announcement.11, 12 However, the offer period
_______________
11. It is normally impossible to infer whether the company considers that information in the prospectus
will cause investors’ valuations to change. A remarkable exception is the letter presenting the placing and open
offer by Harrington Kilbride plc dated 23 August 1995, which notes the Directors’ opinions that ‘the mid-
market price... reflects market-makers’ quotations for dealing in small quantities... [and not] the price at which
investors would be prepared to invest further significant sums in the Company’, and that ‘despite recent
announcements... the market price reflects optimism about the future under new management instead of the
current and recent trading performance’ (p. 9).
12. The expected impact of the announcement could in principle be inferred by comparing analysts’
forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) before and after. Such a study would be awkward in practice. The results
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would be sensitive to the adjustment for the scrip element and there are complicating events accompanying
most issues, for example an acquisition or restructuring of debt.
CAARs are negative both for poor performers (-9.9%) and for healthy issuers (-13.4%).
Possible explanations include release of negative information during the offer period, delayed
reaction to the depth of discount, and price pressure due to sale of rights. Overall, the results
in Tables 5 and 6 imply that some issuers do adjust offer prices for the anticipated market
reaction on announcement, and that, in deeply discounted issues, the average dis-to-TERP
considerably overstates the average anticipated reward for buyers of  placed shares. The
evidence is consistent with submissions by corporate financiers to the MMC (1999, p. 30) that
deep-discounts are associated with a negative market reaction and are used for ‘rescue’ issues.
Further research would be required to establish why there is no negative relation between
discounts and abnormal returns in other markets.13
5.3 Discounts and liquidity
Existing shares can be sold through a broker at the market price, but when shares are
placed, the price is usually several percentage points below the market price (Tables 3 and 4).
We consider two possible reasons for the difference; the first relates to the size of offers and
the second to costs of investing in the issuer. The value of a typical offer is very much larger
than the value of a typical market trade; across our sample the proceeds exceed the average
total value of shares traded in a day by 452 times on average (median 79 times). Issues are
normally bought by many investors, but the size of the larger blocks purchased will still be
much larger than the typical trade. UK market makers set limits to the size of trade for which
their quotes are valid, and there is US evidence that unusually large sales can not be carried
out at the market price. Holthausen et al (1987) find that secondary trades of medium sized
blocks (average 1.70% of shares in issue) initiated by sellers are at a discount related to the
size of the block. The block sale price is 2.46% lower on average than the price of the
preceding trade, whereas the price of small, non-block sales is 1.13% lower on average than
the preceding price. Mikkelson & Partch (1985) study somewhat larger, underwritten
secondary sales. The offer price is the same as the market price in the majority of these
_______________
13. For example, perhaps ‘rescue’ issues do not occur in these markets. There is also the question why
Marsh (1977, pp. 411-2) finds no relation between discounts and abnormal returns in the UK. He measures the
market reaction by the abnormal return during the month of the announcement, because a database of daily
share returns did not exist at the time of his study. Any temporary price pressure during the offer period may
have been obscured by a price rise before the announcement or recovery post offer. But there is probably a
genuine difference in the results between his sample from 1962-75 and ours from 1985-96.
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underwritten sales, but the authors find that underwriter spreads are related to the size of the
placing as a proportion of the total shares, and suggest that this is evidence of limited liquidity.
There may, therefore, be a relation between the discount and liquidity of the issuer’s shares.
We measure liquidity by the average value traded on days when there is a trade
(ln(value traded)) and by the bid-ask spread, and we measure the offer size in relation to
liquidity by ln(proceeds/value traded). If liquidity is a factor in setting the discount, depth of
discount will be positively related to bid-ask spread and to ln(proceeds/value traded), and
negatively related to ln(value traded). The days on which there is a trade and the value of
shares traded on those days are measured over 300 trading days starting 20 days after the offer
close. A post-offer measurement period is used to maximise the sample size; trading data only
becomes available from mid-1993 for most companies. Bid and ask prices are extracted from
Datastream for five working days starting one month preceding the offer announcement (they
are not available from Extel). The bid-ask spread for each day is calculated as
(Offer price - bid price)
(Offer price + bid price)/2
and the figure used is the average spread over the five days. Unfortunately, many companies
could not be found on Datastream, presumably because they have been delisted. This probably
results in selection bias towards larger and more successful companies.
In unreported regressions of dis-to-mkt or dis-to-TERP on a single liquidity measure,
each measure has the sign expected and is significant at the 1% level, with the coefficient on
bid-ask spread being much the most significant. However, the three measures are correlated
with each other, and in regressions with all three as explanatory variables, only bid-ask spread
is significant. It should be noted that bid-ask spread is not merely a measure of liquidity: it is
also a non-negligible cost of trading; the average spread in our sample is 5.5% (median 1.4%).
Buyers of placed shares lose half the spread when they sell; they pay the offer price but only
receive the bid price. Buyers of rights lose half the spread on the shares plus half the spread on
the rights, which they buy at the ask price. A positive relation between depth of discount and
bid-ask spread could therefore indicate that issuers compensate investors for the spread. Since
the univariate relations between the discount and ln(value traded) and ln(proceeds/value
traded) appear to be due to their correlation with bid-ask spread, the evidence is ambiguous
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on whether the discount is related to liquidity or whether it reflects compensation for the
spread.
5.4 Discounts and investigation costs
A second explanation for the discount in placed shares is that it compensates buyers
for costs of investing in an issuer of new equity. We follow Hertzel & Smith (1993) in testing
for costs of investigating the issuer. Other possible costs of investment include the bid-ask
spread, costs of rebalancing the portfolio (Hansen, 1988) and, for investors acquiring or
increasing a large shareholding, costs to be incurred in monitoring and advising the company
(Wruck, 1989). We use two of Hertzel & Smith’s proxies for investigation costs; market
capitalisation divided by shareholder’s funds (mkt-to-book), and a dummy variable which
equals one if the issuer has negative interest cover in the two financial years preceding the
issue, and zero otherwise (financial distress). The argument for mkt-to-book is that it is more
costly to value intangible assets than tangible assets; the argument for financial distress is that
investigation costs will be higher if the issuer is in difficulty.14 We also include the natural log
of the issuer’s market capitalisation (ln(mkt cap)), since there is less public information about
smaller listed companies. To cope with extremely low or negative book values, issuers with a
mkt-to-book figure of more than 20 times, or with a negative book value, are given a figure of
20. The sample in these tests is limited to issues after 1 July 1991, for which the accounting
data required for mkt-to-book and financial distress could be obtained from scanned
prospectuses in Extel. Unreported regressions indicate that all three of the proxies for
investigation costs have explanatory power.
_______________
14. Other variables which Hertzel & Smith find to be significantly related to the discount in private
placings are the number of shares as a percentage of the total number post issue (fraction placed; positive
relation), the placing proceeds (negative), a dummy variable for placings of shares which can not be sold
within two years (positive) and a dummy for placings to a single purchaser (negative; at least 30 of their 106
placings are predominantly to one buyer). The last two variables are not applicable to our sample. The fraction
placed proxies for the greater cost of investigating the value of new equity than existing equity, but it is not
clear a priori why this should be related to discount, and the relation is not significant in all of Hertzel &
Smith’s regressions. The discount rewards the buyer of each share; why should investigation costs per share be
expected to increase with the fraction placed? Placing proceeds proxies for economies of scale in investigation,




Several variables have been identified which, considered separately, explain some of
the variation in discounts. We now regress dis-to-mkt and dis-to-TERP on all the variables:
daily std error; the abnormal return on announcement (announcement AR); bid-ask spread;
financial distress; mkt-to-book; ln(mkt cap); and a dummy variable which equals one for a
rights issue and zero for an open offer (rights issue). Announcement AR proxies for the
change in price expected by companies on announcement of the issue and associated news.
Rights issue is included because the discount is a smaller cost in rights issues. It is not a cost at
all in the 58% of rights issues without any placed shares, and the cost of a given dis-to-TERP
is half as much in the case of pre-renounced rights as it is in an open offer or private placing.
Also the risk of offer failure would be expected to matter more in rights issues, since the
market for rights can only operate if the rights have a value. Data limitations restrict the
sample to 348 rights issues and 167 open offers.
The results are in Table 7. For the full sample, all the variables have the sign expected
and are significant at the 5% level or better except ln(mkt cap). Much the most significant
variable is rights issue, suggesting that the greater cost of the discount in open offers, and
greater concern about the risk of offer failure in rights issues, have a major impact on the
choice of discount. The results for the two types of offer are difficult to compare because,
although the regressions explain more of the variation in discounts across open offers
(adjusted R2 = 48% compared with 40% for the rights issue sample), the coefficients for the
open offer sample are mostly less significant, after adjusting for heteroscedasticity. The greater
significance of daily std error in rights issues is consistent with greater concern about offer
failure. One might have expected discounts to be more sensitive to variations in investigation
costs in open offers, given that all involve placed shares, but only one of the three proxies for
investigation costs, financial distress, is more significant in the open offer sample. In
summary, discounts are related to the volatility of the issuer’s shares, especially in rights
issues, to anticipated changes in price on announcement, and to costs of investing in the issuer.
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Table 7. Determinants of discounts
Daily std error  =  standard error from a market model regression estimated using daily
returns during 80 days before and 80 days after a period starting five days before the
announcement and ending 20 days after the offer close; announcement AR  =  abnormal return
on issuer’s shares on announcement; bid-ask spread  =  mean of (ask price - bid price)/((ask
price + bid price)/2) measured over five days one month before the announcement date
(source of bid and ask prices: Datastream); mkt-to-book  =  market capitalisation of issuer the
day before the announcement divided by the most recent value of shareholders’ funds in the
prospectus (if the ratio exceeds 20, or shareholders’ funds are negative, mkt-to-book is set at
20); financial distress  =  one if the issuer’s interest cover is less than one in the two
consecutive accounting years preceding the announcement, and zero otherwise; ln(mkt cap)  =
natural log of the issuer’s market capitalisation; rights issue  =  one for a rights issue and zero
otherwise. t-statistics, in italics, are calculated using White’s correction for heteroscedasticity.
The expected sign of the coefficient is in brackets.
___________________________________________________________________________
All issues Rights issues Open offers
Dis-to- Dis-to- Dis-to- Dis-to- Dis-to- Dis-to-
mkt TERP mkt TERP mkt TERP
Constant 0.068 -0.028 0.108 0.007 0.102 -0.007
1.37 -0.99 1.72 0.13 1.67 -0.22
Daily std error 2.280 1.799 2.700 1.935 2.088 2.054
(+) 3.14 3.77 3.31 3.40 1.51 2.22
Announcement AR -0.399 -0.284 -0.409 -0.310 -0.393 -0.216
(-) -3.45 -3.96 -3.01 -3.27 -1.89 -2.28
Bid-ask spread 0.448 0.290 0.659 0.422 0.247 0.116
(+) 2.29 2.13 2.72 1.81 0.84 0.68
Mkt-to-book 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(+) 2.53 2.78 1.99 2.25 1.40 1.33
Financial  distress 0.042 0.011 0.025 -0.003 0.071 0.039
(+) 2.48 0.98 1.25 -0.21 2.32 2.44
Ln(mkt cap) -0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.006 -0.008 0.002
(-) -1.30 1.41 -0.20 1.43 -1.35 0.56
Rights issue 0.104 0.072
(+) 10.14 9.84
Adj R2 47.7% 42.0% 39.9% 28.0% 46.8% 47.2%
F-value 67.8 54.0 39.1 23.3 25.0 25.4
N 515 515 348 348 167 167
___________________________________________________________________________
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6. Implications for choice of issue method
6.1 A problem with rights issues
The extent of placing at a discount which we have documented shows that it is
common for buyers of new shares to be rewarded, unless they are existing shareholders taking
up their entitlements. But rights issues are not designed to reward buyers of rights sold on the
market. The only way buyers can extract a reward is by paying less than the difference
between the TERP and the offer price, assuming that the TERP estimates the ‘true’ value of
the shares ex-rights. If the rights are trading for less than this difference, the share price must
fall to prevent arbitrage, and should recover after the offer (the Appendix provides a numerical
example). But the price may not fall, because if it does the shares should attract buyers
anticipating a rise in price after the offer closes, in which case would-be buyers of rights will
simply be unable to obtain a reward. If buyers of rights are rewarded, we would expect (i) a
negative abnormal return during rights issues, followed by a positive abnormal return once
trading in rights ends, and (ii) an absence of this pattern in open offers. The US evidence on (i)
is mixed (Eckbo & Masulis, 1992; Hansen, 1988; Singh, 1997). Temporary price pressure may
be easier to identify in the UK because the period from announcement to offer close is shorter
(US rights issues are announced about one month before the start of the offer period).
The event study results for issues in aggregate, reported in Table 8, appear to support
predictions (i) and (ii). There is a pattern in rights issues of a temporary price fall with some
recovery after rights cease trading, and this pattern is not found in open offers. The CAAR on
announcement and during the offer is -2.20% and -2.70% respectively for rights issues and
2.04% and -0.20% for open offers.15 The combined CAAR for offer close plus the 20 days
post offer is 3.07% in rights issues and 2.15% in open offers. The differences between the
CAARs for the two types of offer are significant at the 1% level for the announcement period,
offer period and offer close. There is also some evidence of price reversal in rights issues for
individual shares; the correlation coefficient between cumulative abnormal returns for
_______________
15. The more negative market reaction on announcement of rights issues has also been found by Burton et
al (1999) and Suzuki (1997). The reaction to rights issues appears to have become more negative over time.
Marsh (1979) reports an average change in price of -0.6% on announcement day for rights issues during 1962-
75, when all issues were rights issues; Levis (1995) reports a two day announcement abnormal return of -
1.33% for rights issues during 1982-91.
Table 8. Cumulative average abnormal returns
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See Table 5 for method of estimation.
___________________________________________________________________________
Announcement Offer Offer Post
 (days -1 to 0) period close offer
(+1 to C-2) (C-1 to C) (C+1 to C+20)
All issues -0.93% -1.95% 0.56% 2.01%
(N = 1,010) -9.47 -4.86 6.58 7.16
% negative 58.1 57.8 45.1 44.3
Rights issues -2.20% -2.70% 0.77% 2.30%
(N = 704) -22.68 -7.09 7.46 6.58
% negative 68.0 60.1 41.8 44.2
Open offers 1.99% -0.20% 0.08% 1.35%
(N = 306) 17.19 1.931 0.64 3.03
% negative 35.3 52.6 52.6 44.4




1. A CAAR and its z-statistic can differ in sign because the abnormal returns are not equally
weighted in arriving at the z-statistic. 2. t-statistic for open offer CAAR less rights issue
CAAR. 3. p-value of Wilcoxon’s rank sum test.large sales of rights are anticipated.
___________________________________________________________________________
announcement- plus-offer and for close-plus-post-offer is -0.09 (t = -2.34) in rights issues but
0.13 (t = 2.35) in open offers. However, there are two qualifications. First, much of the
difference between the results for the two types of offer on announcement and during the offer
is associated with the deeper discount in rights issues (Table 4), although the discount might
be related to anticipated sales of rights. Second, part of the difference between the reactions to
the two types of offer is due to the significant positive reaction to open offers. This may be
because investors view an open offer as more like a private placing than a rights issue, and
treat the fact that there are investors willing to buy the shares as a positive signal. Wruck
(1989) and Hertzel & Smith (1993) report a positive average abnormal return on
announcement of private placings in the USA. Thus the evidence regarding price pressure
during rights issues is inconclusive, and even if buyers of rights do benefit from temporarily
depressed prices in some issues, the benefit is highly uncertain ex ante.
6.2 Growth of open offers
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Our primary explanation for the growth of open offers is that buyers of shares not
subscribed for by existing shareholders often require a reward, and it is much easier to provide
this via an open offer than via a rights issue. If non-subscribers always believed they would be
able to sell their rights in a rights issue at a price equal to the difference between the TERP
and the offer price, they would never prefer an open offer at a discount, and never pre-
renounce shares in a rights issue. Yet in open offers at a discount, an average of 49% of the
shares offered pro rata to existing holders are not taken up by them, and 28% of rights issues
at a discount have pre-renounced shares. The implication is clearly that sale of rights on the
market would be very difficult. It is true that rights can be placed in a rights issue if they are
pre-renounced. But there is no point in having a rights issue if non-subscribers forego the
opportunity to sell rights on the market. Furthermore, a dis-to-TERP approaching twice as
deep as in an open offer is required to provide buyers of pre-renounced shares in a rights issue
with the same reward (see Appendix), and there are various reasons why a deeper discount
may be unwelcome. First, in the large minority of rights issues involving placed shares, there is
an obvious incentive to minimise the discount (this does not seem to have been noted before as
a problem with deep discount rights issues.) Second, since deep discounts are associated with
a negative market reaction in the UK, a healthy company might be concerned that a deep
discount would be misinterpreted. Third, a deeper discount can imply larger capital gains tax
liabilities for some individual sellers of rights (MMC, 1999, p. 31). Fourth, there may be
‘misunderstandings and misplaced concerns’ regarding discounts, as Marsh (1994, p. 38)
believes.
The discussion implies that the comparative advantage of an open offer is positively
related to the proportion of the new shares which will not be taken up by existing shareholders
and to the costs of investing in the issuer. The evidence supports both predictions. We see
from Table 2 that a higher proportion of open offers have shares which are pre-renounced or
privately placed, and that the average proportion pre-renounced or privately placed is higher
than in rights issues. These differences are significant at the 1% level. At the same time,
companies choosing open offers are comparatively expensive to invest in (Table 9). The mean
bid-ask spread and mkt-to-book, and the proportion of issues in financial distress, are
significantly higher in open offers, and the mean mkt cap is significantly smaller.
Table 9. Comparison between rights issues and open offers: proxies for costs of
investment in the issuer
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The sample is restricted to issues after 1 January 1990, since before then open offers had not
become established. See Table 7 for definitions.
___________________________________________________________________________
Rights Open Test statistics
issues offers for difference
Bid-ask spread
  Mean 4.7% 7.6% 4.32,1 0.002
  Median 2.6% 4.5%
  N 452 209
Mkt-to-book
  Mean 490% 594% 2.45,0.01
  Median 231% 287%
  N 588 380
Mkt cap (September 1996 £m)
  Mean £214.5 £15.0 -9.80, 0.00
  Median £44.0 £6.5
  N 735 427
Proportion in financial distress 20.2% 29.6% 2.991
  N 510 311
___________________________________________________________________________
1. t-statistic for open offer mean or proportion less rights issue mean or proportion. 2. p-value
of Wilcoxon’s rank sum test.
___________________________________________________________________________
Given that new investors need to be rewarded, it might be asked why open offers were
only introduced in the late 1980s. One possibility is that the number of issues in which large
shareholders were unwilling or unable to take up their rights had been increasing. Marsh
(1977, p. 39) notes that ‘virtually all’ seasoned offers were rights issues during 1962-75. His
sample includes all 1,128 rights issues by UK companies during this period, and of these only
13 involved pre-renounced shares and none was accompanied by a private placing for cash. It
was ‘fairly common practice’ to consult with and pre-sell shares to existing shareholders
before the public announcement, but Marsh makes no mention of placing with new investors.
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6.3 Comment on the disappearance of rights in the USA
Our evidence gives new support to the view that the main advantage of firm
commitments over rights issues lies in the placing or bookbuilding process. The benefits of
placing have to date been regarded as fairly modest. Hansen (1988) notes that selling rights
involves brokerage fees, a bid-ask spread on the rights, and capital gains tax for some sellers;
Eckbo & Masulis (1992, p. 312) refer to ‘issuer-borne rights distribution costs’. Such
transactions costs are avoided by placing shares. On the positive side, Hanson suggests that
the placing process reduces the costs of finding buyers and reduces portfolio adjustment costs
incurred by buyers. It might be added that the process enables investors to obtain private
information through the issuer’s advisers and to gain direct access to the company, for
example via a presentations. The placing process may thereby reduce investigation costs.
However, we argue that this list omits the biggest benefit of placing, which is that it enables
buyers to be rewarded. The paper has documented the common use of placing and the size of
rewards to buyers of placed shares, which can be observed in the UK. The substantial rewards
to investors in most US private placings can also be observed, but private placings of equity
are rare (Hertzel & Smith, 1993, Table 2). US firm commitment offers are made at negligible
discounts (Loderer et al, 1991), and there appears to be no issue-by-issue evidence on the
proportion of the underwriter’s spread which is passed on to investors. But it would be
reasonable to expect the rewards obtained by investors in firm commitments to be of the same
order as those obtained by buyers of placed shares in equivalent issues in the UK.16 If so, US
rights issues will have suffered the same disadvantage as we have highlighted in UK rights
issues.
Debate about the benefit of placing has revolved around whether there is temporary
price pressure during rights issues. Hansen (1988) presents evidence of price reversal, which
he argues reflects a price concession on sale of rights. His findings have not been confirmed by
Eckbo & Masulis (1992) or Singh (1997), and the evidence in this paper regarding temporary
price pressure in UK rights issues is inconclusive (Section 6.1). But doubt about the existence
of price pressure need not imply that buyers of rights require little _______________
16. It is conventional to view 60% of the spread as a selling fee (Hansen & Torregrosa, 1992); presumably
some or all of this is passed on to investors. US underwriter spreads are about one third higher than the cash
costs of issue in the UK (Armitage, 2000), probably because spreads include rewards to investors which in the
UK are provided mainly via offer price discounts.
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compensation. On the contrary, the doubt confirms that it is difficult for buyers of rights to
extract a reward, and helps explain why some issuers opt for open offers, or firm commitments
in the USA. We have shown that the open offer method tends to be used for those issues in
which we would expect sales of rights to be most problematic, ie for issues with a relatively
low contribution from existing shareholders and relatively high costs of investing in the issuer.
7. Conclusion
The use of placing at a substantial discount is much more commonplace than may
previously have been realised, especially in issues by smaller listed companies. The view that
the typical seasoned offer in the UK is a conventional rights issue, in which the discount is
unimportant, needs to be revised. The costs of seasoned offers have hitherto been seen as the
cash costs of issue plus any abnormal fall in the issuer’s market value on announcement of the
offer. Our evidence indicates that a third type of cost is material in many issues, which is the
reward necessary to attract new investors, provided mainly through offering placed shares at a
discount. It is noteworthy that the placing process in seasoned offers is similar to that in initial
public offers, and that new investors IPOs also tend to be rewarded through underpricing of
the new shares.
The analysis of determinants of the discount offers some support for the theory that
discounts compensate new investors for costs of investing in the issuer, though we have not
attempted to show that costs of investment explain the whole of the discounts observed in
placed shares. Comparisons between companies choosing rights issues and companies
choosing open offers suggest that the open offer method, together with private placing, is used
in situations in which it is important to reward new investors. Companies choosing open offers
are relatively small and costly to invest in, and a large proportion of the shares are not
subscribed for by existing shareholders, implying that they are unwilling or unable to supply
the company with the new equity it seeks. The rights issue mechanism for bringing in new
investors is sale of rights on the market, but it does not enable buyers of rights to be rewarded.
We have argued that open offers and private placings have come to be preferred primarily
because it is straightforward to reward the buyers of placed shares.
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Appendix: numerical example of rewarding new investors in an open offer and in a
rights issue
Suppose the existing share price is 100p, there are one million shares in issue and it is
proposed to make a one-for-one open offer. The company’s advisers believe that a discount to
the TERP representing 10% of the offer price will be needed to secure buyers of shares not
subscribed for by those entitled to them. The offer price (Poffer) can then be calculated as
follows:
Poffer  =  TERP/1.1  =  [100p(0.5) + Poffer(0.5)]/1.1
∴ Poffer  =  50p/(0.6)  =  83.33p,
the TERP is 100p(0.5) + 83.33p(0.5)  =  91.67p and the dis-to-TERP is 9.1%. The amount
raised is £833,333. Assuming that the market price of the shares ex-rights is equal to the
TERP, a non-subscribing shareholder with 100 shares suffers a loss of wealth of 100 x 8.33p
=  £8.33.
Alternatively, the company could choose a rights issue. In the open offer, investors
will only buy shares not taken up at a discount representing a fee of 10% per pound of new
investment, and we assume it is the same in the rights issue. If there are pre-renounced shares,
the terms must be set so that the discount to the TERP is 20% of the offer price. The buyers
would pay 10% for the rights, leaving them with a reward of 10%, as in an open offer. The
offer price will be lower than 83.33p, and more shares will be issued to raise the same amount.
Solving the simultaneous equations
Poffer     =  TERP/1.2  =  [100p(1m/(1m+N)) + Poffer(N/(1m+N))]/1.2
and Poffer(N)  =  £833,333m,
gives an offer price of 69.44p and 1.2m new shares (= N). The new TERP is (100p x 0.4545)
+ (69.44p x 0.5455)  =  83.33p, and the dis-to-TERP is 16.7%. For buyers of rights in the
market to obtain a 10% reward, the market price must fall temporarily during the offer by 10%
of the offer price, that is by 6.94p to 76.39p ex-rights, and then recover to 83.33p. If the share
price does not fall to this extent, or does not recover fully, buyers of rights in the market are
not as well rewarded as buyers of pre-renounced rights or as placees in an equivalent open
offer. Our non-subscribing shareholder sells his rights for 76.39p - 69.44p  =  6.95p each,
which means he receives 120 x 6.95p  =  £8.34, and his 100 shares are worth £83.33 after the
offer. His wealth declines by £8.33, as in the open offer.
33
References
Armitage, Seth, 1999, ‘The proportion underwritten and reaction to share issues: UK tests of
the Eckbo-Masulis theory’, working paper, University of Edinburgh.
Armitage, Seth, 2000, ‘The direct costs of UK rights issues and open offers’, European
Financial Management 6, 57-68.
Arnold, Glen, 1998, Corporate Financial Management, Financial Times Pitman Publishing.
Barclay, Michael J. & Clifford G. Holderness, 1989, ‘Private benefits from control of public
corporations’, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 371-95.
Bigelli, Marco, 1998, ‘The quasi-split effect, active insiders and the Italian market reaction to
equity rights issues’, European Financial Management 4, 185-206.
Bøhren, Øyvind, B. Espen Eckbo & Dag Michalsen, 1997, ‘Why underwrite rights offerings?
Some new evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 223-61.
Brealey, Richard A. & Stewart C. Myers, 2000, Principles of Corporate Finance, 6th ed,
McGraw Hill.
Burton, B.M., A.A. Lonie & D.M. Power, 1999, ‘Does the issue method influence the market
reaction to seasoned equity announcements?’ Applied Economic Letters 6, pp. 459-62.
Eckbo, B. Espen & Ronald W. Masulis, 1992, ‘Adverse selection and the rights offer
paradox’, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 293-332.
Goh, Jeremy, Michael J. Gombola, Hei Wai Lee & Feng-Ying Liu, 1999, ‘Private placement
of common equity and earnings expectations’, The Financial Review 34, 19-32.
Hansen, Robert S., 1988, ‘The demise of the rights issue’, Review of Financial Studies 1,
289-309.
Hansen, Robert S. & Paul Torregrosa, 1992, ‘Underwriter Compensation and Corporate
Monitoring’, Journal of Finance 47, 1537-55.
Hertzel, Michael & Richard L. Smith, 1993, ‘Market discounts and shareholder gains for
placing equity privately’, Journal of Finance 48, 459-85.
Holthausen, Robert W., Richard W. Leftwich and David Mayers, 1987, ‘The effect of large
block transactions on security prices’, Journal of Financial Economics 19, 237-67.
Kothare, Meeta, 1997, ‘The effects of equity issues on ownership structure and stock liquidity:
a comparison of rights and public offerings’, Journal of Financial Economics 43, 131-48.
Levis, Mario, 1995, ‘Seasoned equity offerings and the short- and long-run performance of
initial public offerings in the UK’, European Financial Management 1, 125-46.
34
Loderer, Claudio F., Dennis P. Sheehan & Gregory B. Kadlec, 1991, ‘The pricing of equity
offerings’, Journal of Financial Economics 29, 35-57.
Loderer, Claudio F. & Heinz Zimmerman, 1988, ‘Stock offerings in a different institutional
setting: the Swiss case, 1973-83’, Journal of Banking and Finance 12, pp. 353-78.
London Stock Exchange, 1997, The Listing Rules.
Marsh, Paul, 1977, ‘An analysis of equity rights issues on the London Stock Exchange’,
unpublished PhD thesis, London Business School.
Marsh, Paul, 1979, ‘Equity rights issues and the efficiency of the UK stock market’, Journal
of Finance 34, 839-62.
Marsh, Paul, 1994, ‘Underwriting of rights issues: a study of the returns earned by sub-
underwriters from UK rights issues’, Office of Fair Trading Research Paper No. 6.
Mikkelson, Wayne H. & M. Megan Partch, 1985, ‘Stock price effects and costs of secondary
distributions’, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 165-94.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), 1999, Underwriting Services for Share Offers,
Cm 4168, The Stationery Office.
Singh, Ajai K., 1997, ‘Layoffs and underwritten rights offers’, Journal of Financial
Economics 43, 105-30.
Smith, Clifford W., 1977, ‘Alternative methods for raising capital: rights versus underwritten
offerings’, Journal of Financial Economics 5, 273-307.
Suzuki, Kazunori, 1997, ‘Equity issues in the UK: usage of funds and reaction of the stock
market’, working paper, London Business School.
Tsangarakis, Nickolaos, 1996, Equity rights issues: signaling vs issue price irrelevance
hypothesis’, European Financial Management 2, 299-310.
Wruck, Karen Hopper, 1989, ‘Equity ownership concentration and firm value’, Journal of
Financial Economics 23, 3-28.
